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THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. STANLEY, JR.*AND IRMA S. RUSSELL**
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was created by dividing the Eighth
Circuit. Until the recent formation of the Eleventh Circuit,' this was the
only time geographical boundaries had been altered since the present federal
circuit court system was instituted in 1891.2 The Tenth Circuit came into
existence in April 1929, the eve of a period in our nation's history that was to
see vast-almost revolutionary-changes in our system of justice.
I. BACKGROUND: APPEALS IN THE EARLY DAYS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the
United States "in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish."'3 The Judiciary Act of
17894 created a three-tier system similar in theory, though quite different in
practice and jurisdiction from the three-tier system in effect today.5 The Act
established thirteen district courts, one per state. Although the country was
divided into three circuits-Southern, Middle, and Eastern, 6 there was no
counterpart to the current United States judge of the court of appeals. The
six Supreme Court Justices had the duty of riding circuit. Two justices were
* Senior United States District Judge, District of Kansas; LL.B. 1928, Kansas City
School of Law (University of Missouri, Kansas City). Judge Stanley has served as United States
District Judge since 1958.
** Attorney, Olathe, Kansas. B.A. 1969; B.S. 1974; M.A. 1972; J.D. 1980, University of
Kansas. Ms. Russell served as law clerk to Tenth Circuit Judge James K. Logan from 1980 to
1981.
1. The new Eleventh Circuit, composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, was created
out of the Fifth Circuit. The reconstituted Fifth Circuit is now composed of the District of the
Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. IV 1980).
2. Before the Act of 1891, boundaries were changed on several occasions. In 1802 six
circuits were created, embracing all the states then in the union. Additional changes were nec-
essary when states were added to the union. In 1842 the boundaries of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits were redrawn. Act of August 16, ch. 1891, 1842, 5 Stat. 507. In 1863, the
boundaries of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits were redrawn when Indiana was detached from
the Seventh and included in the Eighth. Act of Jan. 28, 1863, ch. 13, 12 Stat. 637. See Sur-
rency,A Histoqy of Federal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REv. 214, 225 (1963). It has been proposed that the
Ninth Circuit be split. See A Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
The Geographic Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits- Recommendation for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223,
234 (1973) [hereinafter Geographic Boundaries].
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
5. In addition to this three-tier system, other courts that derive their powers from Article
III were later created by statute. See Maris, The Federal Judicial System, 12 MOD. FED. PRAC.
DIG. 815, 821-22 (1960).
6. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74.
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assigned to each circuit and would sit with a district judge to constitute the
circuit court. 7 Two districts, Maine and Kentucky, were not under the juris-
diction of any circuit court.8
These circuit courts not only exercised appellate jurisdiction, but origi-
nal jurisdiction in certain cases.9 They held concurrent original jurisdiction
in diversity cases with an amount in controversy in excess of $500.1 In 1793,
Congress provided that only one Supreme Court Justice need sit on each
circuit court, which meant that a single justice and two district judges could
constitute the circuit court.'1  It also empowered the single Supreme Court
Justice to sit as the circuit court in cases in which the district judge "shall be
absent, or shall have been of counsel, or be concerned in interest in any cause
then pending .... 12 Congress later provided that each justice need sit as a
circuit judge during only one session each year.' 3 Despite reform attempts' 4
and the creation of the courts of appeals in 1891,15 this system remained
basically unchanged in theory until IS 1.16 In practice, the Supreme Court
Justices stopped riding circuit sometime in the second half of the nineteenth
century. '
7
The office of circuit judge was created in 1869,18 with one circuit judge
assigned to each circuit. The additional judge provided several alternatives
for review of appellate matters: Circuit court could be held, as before, by the
7. Parker, The FederalJudicza/S,stem, 14 F.R.D. 361 (1954). Under 28 U.S.C. § 42 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) the Supreme Court allots a justice to each circuit to serve as circuit justice.
Although the justices are authorized to sit on the appellate court, they are no longer required to
do so. 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (1976). The circuit justices who have been assigned to the Tenth
Circuit are as follows:
Willis Van Devanter, 1929-1937 (279 U.S. iv) (1929).
Pierce Butler, 1937-1940 (302 U.S. iv) (1937).
Stanley Reed, 1940 (309 U.S. iv) (1940).
Frank Murphy, 1941-1943 (314 U.S. v) (1941).
Wiley B. Rutledge, 1943-1949 (318 U.S. iv) (1943).
Tom C. Clark, 1949-1957 (338 U.S. v) (1949).
Charles Whittaker, 1957-1962 (353 U.S. iv) (1957).
William 0. Douglas, April 2, 1962-April 16, 1962 (369 U.S. vi) (1962).
Byron R. White, 1962-present (370 U.S. iv) (1962).
8. See supra note 6.
9. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. The circuit court had original
jurisdiction to hear most civil litigation, including diversity cases, and to hear important crimi-
nal cases involving violations of federal statutes.
10. Surrency, supra note 2, at 215. In 1842 the circuit and district courts were given con-
current original jurisdiction for trials of noncapital crimes. Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 3,
5 Stat. 516, 517.
11. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333.
12. Id. at 334. For example, Aaron Burr was tried by a circuit court composed only of
Chief Justice John Marshall and District Judge Cyrus Griffin. See United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 25 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14.692b).
13. Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676.
14. See Surrency, supra note 2, at 228-31. In 1801 the Midnight Judges Bill provided for 16
additional circuit judges and increased the number of circuits to six. It also reduced the number
of Supreme Court justices to five and relieved them of circuit duty. The entire statute was
repealed the following year. See Maris, supra note 5, at 816.
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1027. The Act created exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in the circuit courts except for decisions that could be appealed directly to
the Supreme Court. See id at 1133-34.
17. Surrency, supra note 2, at 223.
18. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
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Supreme Court Justice assigned to the circuit, the local district judge, and
the new circuit judge, or by any two of these three sitting together. 9
The Judiciary Act of 1891 (Act) 20 established the basic foundation of
the current federal judiciary system. To reduce the overloaded docket of the
Supreme Court, the Act created a circuit court of appeals for each of the
existing circuits. 2 1 The Circuit Court of Appeals heard appeals from both
district and circuit courts.
22
When the circuit courts were abolished in 1911,23 their original jurisdic-
tion vested in the district courts. 24 The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals
was appellate only, and extended over all final judgments of the federal dis-
trict courts except those directly appealable to the Supreme Court.25 In
1925 Congress significantly limited the types of cases that could be directly
appealed to the Supreme Court,26 thus enlarging the jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit courts. Their jurisdiction was later further enlarged to include enforce-
ment of the orders of certain agencies, 2 7 review of decisions of the Tax
Court,2 8 and of actions by federal agencies.2 9 The Judicial Code of 1948
changed the name Circuit Court of Appeals to Court of Appeals.
30
When a new state was added to the Union, a single judicial district with
one judge was added to the federal judicial system. The only exception to
this rule was Oklahoma which was organized into two districts at the time it
joined the Union.3' Later, some other states were also divided into addi-
tional districts. Redistricting was not always accomplished in conjunction
with the appointment of an additional judge for the new district. 32 In cases
where an additional judge was not appointed, the only benefit gained by
19. Surrency, supra note 2, at 232.
20. Act of Mar. 2, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 827.
21. Surrency, supra note 2, at 233.
22. Id
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087. The Act is entitled, "[ain Act
to codify, revise and amend the laws relating to the judiciary."
24. Surrency, supra note 2, at 216.
25. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 128, 36 Stat. 1087, 1133-34.
26. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128, 43 Stat. 936; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291, Prior Law
on Appellate Jurisdiction. Before this Act parties had a right of direct appeal from the district
court to the Supreme Court as follows:
Any case in which the jurisdiction of the court was in issue, in which case the question
ofjurisdiction alone was certified to the Supreme Court; final sentences and decrees in
prize causes; any case which involved the construction or application of the Constitu-
tion of the United States; any case in which the constitutionality of any law of the
United States or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority
was drawn in question; and any case in which the constitution or law of a State was
claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.
Act Mar. 3, 1891, § 5, 26 Stat. 827 (currently found at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (1966) (historical
note)). The 1925 Act abolished the right of appeal to the Supreme Court except in specific
cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1976).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
28. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3, 80 Stat. 1107, 1109 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 7482 (1976)).
29. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-702 (1976).
30. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 43
(1976)).
31. Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-234, § 13, 34 Stat. 267, 275 (codified in scattered
sections of 16 and 28 U.S.C.)
32. See Surrency, supra note 2, at 238-39.
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redistricting was additional locus for the court. Generally, each district had
its own federal district judge, though occasionally two districts would share a
single judge, 33 as occurred in Oklahoma. At present Oklahoma is the only
state in the Tenth Circuit comprising more than one federal judicial district;
it is divided into three districts with some judges appointed to serve in all
three.
The creation of the Tenth Circuit in 1929 was actually the second time
a "Tenth Circuit" had been created in the United States judicial system. In
1863, Congress created ten circuits and increased the number of Supreme
Court Justices to ten.34 The first Tenth Circuit embraced California and
Oregon.35 After three years, this circuit was abolished and the states redis-
tributed among the nine circuits. 36 Subsequently, as new states joined the
Union, they were assigned to one of the nine circuits. In 1940 the District of
Columbia Circuit was added for specific purposes. 37 Later, the District of
Columbia Circuit was given the same authority of the other circuits38 and
the chief judge of the District of Columbia Circuit was included as a mem-
ber of the Judicial Conference. 39 The Eleventh Circuit was added in 198040
because of the growing caseload in the old Fifth Circuit.4 1 Division of the
Ninth Circuit has been advocated. 4 2 In 1982 the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate functions of the United
States Court of Claims were combined into a new United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 43
II. CREATION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT---SOCIAL CLIMATE
When the Tenth Circuit was created in April 1929, the social and polit-
ical climate in the United States was marked by optimism and apparent
stability. 44 Of the new Tenth Circuit's non-Indian inhabitants, many were
only a generation away from the pioneers who had settled along the Oregon
and Santa Fe Trails. Their parents and grandparents taught them self-reli-
ance and independence. Inhabitants also included the descendants of min-
ers and adventurers who came west seeking fortunes and then settled down
33. Id at 239-40.
34. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794.
35. Id
36. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
37. Act of Dec. 29, 1942, ch. 835, § I(d), 56 Stat 1094.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). This was accomplished partially in order to conform the
system to the Supreme Court's expectations. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325
U.S. 283, 288 (1945) (Court referred to "the eleven circuits forming the . . . federal judica-
ture");seealso O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311 (1928).
39. P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 40 (1973).
40. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2,
94 Stat. 1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. IV 1980)).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 1, reprinted n 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4236, 4237.
42. See supra note 2.
43. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 16, 18, 19, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
44. In at least economic terms, this apparent stability proved false. In October 1929, just
seven months later, the stock market crashed and the depression began.
[Vol. 66:2
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to establish towns, ranches, and farms. The states in the Tenth Circuit had
entered the Union under varying circumstances, and their people were va-
ried in heritage, culture, and life style as were the Indians who had farmed
the valleys and roamed the mountains and plains long before the white set-
tiers arrived.
At the time, most Americans were moderately prosperous, self-satisfied,
and confident of the future. The dollar was backed by gold. In Wealth of
Nations,45 the bible of many respected economists and politicians, Adam
Smith argued that society's good is promoted by the activities of profit-seek-
ing entrepreneurs. John Maynard Keynes' view that government should
manage the economy would not gain its followers until the Depression had
taken its toll.
46
Jurisprudence, "the science which treats of the principles of positive law
and legal relations, '47 was of interest chiefly to philosophers and law profes-
sors. Courts generally did not see their function as requiring consideration of
"the ultimate effect which would be produced if each rule were applied to an
indefinite number of similar cases, and to choose that rule which, when so
applied, will produce the greatest advantage to the community." '48
Practice and procedure in the federal courts were governed by rules that
had prevailed without radical change since the enactment of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.49 The Federal Rules of Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Proce-
dure had not been promulgated. 50 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 5 ' had not yet
overruled Swif? v. Tson.52 Federal practice differed radically on the law and
equity sides, Cases at law were conducted in accordance with the procedural
law of the state in which the court sat, while the Federal Equity Rules gov-
erned the trial of cases in equity. The published rules and regulations of the
federal agencies did not, as they do now, take up fifteen feet of shelf space.
The number of administrative law cases had not yet burgeoned to the point
that led Justice Frankfurter to declare in 1957: "Review of administrative
action, mainly reflecting enforcement of federal regulatory statutes, consti-
tutes the largest category of the court work, comprising one-third of the total
cases decided on the merits."' 53 Ernesto Miranda had not been born. "The
Trilogy" of habeas corpus cases was still thirty years from decision. 54 The
class action, the child of equity, was mentioned more often in scholarly dis-
sertations than in court opinions.
The eighteenth amendment had not yet been repealed by the twenty-
45. A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
46. See, e.g., J.M. KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE (1920); J.M.
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
48. Id
49. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
50. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective Sept. 16, 1938; the Rules of
Criminal Procedure Sept. 1, 1945; the Rules of Appellate Procedure July 1, 1968.
51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
53. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of JustiCes, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793
(1957) quoted in K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 13 (1960).
54. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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first, and thus the "noble experiment"-the prohibition of the manufacture,
sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors-was still underway. Cases
charging violations of the prohibition laws, the Volstead Act,55 cluttered the
criminal dockets of federal trial and appellate courts.
III. LEGISLATION CREATING THE TENTH CIRCUIT
5 6
The efforts of Congress and the bar to alleviate congestion in the circuit
courts, particularly in the Eighth Circuit, began in 1925 and culminated in
1929 with the creation of the Tenth Circuit. Before the creation of the
Tenth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit contained thirteen states touching both
the northern and southern borders of the country (Minnesota and New Mex-
ico) and stretching from Iowa on the east to Utah on the west. After study-
ing the problem of congested dockets, a subcommittee of the American Bar
Association (ABA) drafted a bill, H.R. 5690, that would have redrawn the
areas of all the existing circuits as well as adding a tenth circuit. The Tenth
Circuit would have included the following states: Arizona, California,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 5 7 The bill was
presented to Congress in 1927 without the ABA's endorsement or, indeed, a
consensus of the committee that had created it. 58 It received an overwhelm-
ingly negative response from attorneys and the Congress. 59
Opposition to the bill centered on its failure to create any new judge-
ships6° and also the switching of states from one circuit to another. Con-
gressman Newton objected to the plan because of the differences in the
procedural and substantive law of the existing circuits. 6 1 Some traditional-
ists were opposed to creating an additional circuit on the ground that the
number of circuits should be equal to the number of Supreme Court Jus-
tices. 62 Since 1837 the number of Supreme Court Justices had remained
55. Pub. L. No. 66-6810, 41 Stat. 305, repealedby Liquor Law Repeal & Enforcement Act
1935, ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872.
56. This section draws significantly from D. Bonn, The Geographical Division of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sept. 1974) (research report written for the Federal Judicial
Center).
57. Id at 4.
58. Id at 3. Similarly, in recent recommendations the Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System rejected the idea of realigning all the circuits to equalize the
workload.
We have not recommended a general realignment of all the circuits. To be sure,
the present boundaries are largely the result of historical accident and do not satisfy
such criteria as parity of caseloads and geographical compactness. But these bounda-
ries have stood since the nineteenth century, except for the creation of the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1929, and whatever the actual extent of variation in the law from circuit to
circuit, relocation would take from the bench and bar at least some of the law now
familiar to them. Moreover, the Commission has heard eloquent testimony evidenc-
ing the sense of community shared by lawyers and judges within the present circuits.
Except for the most compelling reasons, we are reluctant to disturb institutions which
have acquired not only the respect but also the loyalty of their constituents.
62 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1973).
59. Bonn, supra note 56, at 4-5.
60. Id
61. Id at 7.
62. Id at 5.
[Vol. 66:2
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fairly constant at nine, 63 although it had once dropped to seven.64
Some even disputed whether the Eighth Circuit was overloaded with
cases. Judge Kimbrough Stone, Senior Judge65 of the Eighth Circuit, de-
clared that in his eleven years on the bench, his court had "never been even
one case behind its docket and it is not now."'6 6 However, the Eighth Circuit
frequently had to use district judges on the circuit court; indeed, district
judges wrote forty percent of the circuit's decisions. 67 This practice of using
district judges on the circuit court was criticized during debates on congres-
sional bills aimed at this problem by Justices Taft and Van Devanter68 and
members of the bar of the Eighth Circuit, particularly because it created
delay at the trial level.
69
After the resounding defeat of H.R. 5690, Chief Justice Taft suggested
that a less sweeping change might accomplish the desired purpose: "My
own impression is that the best thing to do, if you want to do something that
can be done at once and not involve conflicting considerations, is merely to
divide the Eighth Circuit and let all the other circuits stand as they are."
'70
In January 1928, a special ABA subcommittee composed solely of Eighth
Circuit lawyers met to consider dividing the Eighth Circuit. Two bills pro-
viding for such a division were presented to Congress during May 1928.
Congressman Walter H. Newton of Minnesota submitted H.R. 13567, which
called for a division of the circuit into northern and southern areas with
63. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176 (establishing nine as the number of Supreme
Court Justices).
64. See Parker, supra note 7, at 362.
65. At that time, "senior judge" was the title used for the position known today as "chief
judge." See 28 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (revisor's note). The title "chief judge" was given by Con-
gress in recognition of this position's great increase of administrative duties. See H.R. REP. No.
308, accompanying H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A6 (1947). See also P. FisH, supra note 39,
at 244.
66. Letter from K. Stone to I.G. Hersey (Feb. 20, 1928) (on file in the National Archives,
House Jud. Comm. Files) (cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 8).
67. Hearings on HR. 5690, HR. 13567, and HR. 13757 Before the House Comm. on theJudictag,
70th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 63, 72 (Testimony of Justice Van Devanter) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
68. Id. at 66-72.
69. Letter from G.B. Rose to L.C. Dyer (Feb. 17, 1928) (on file in the National Archives,
House Jud. Comm. Files) (cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 18). Senior Judge Stone noted the
problem in a letter to A.C. Paul:
As this bill [The Thatcher Bill-H.R. 13757] provides for but three circuit judges in
each of these two circuits (or groups), the inevitable result in the second group would
be that two district judges would have to sit in every case, in order to keep up with the
docket. This is so because the experience of this court has shown that 30 opinions is a
good annual average for a judge working diligently, which means that each judge can
sit in only 90 cases a year. As this group averages 270 or more cases annually, the
above result is inevitable. This extensive use of district judges would seriously interfere
with and delay trials in the district courts. Two-thirds of the opinions would be writ-
ten by district judges and such opinions would often be delayed because of pressure of
district court work on those judges.
Letter from K. Stone to A.C. Paul (June 30, 1928) (on file in the Library of Congress) (quotedin
Bonn, supra note 56, at 18).
70. Testimony of W.H. Taft, in Heartigs, supra note 67, at 66. Chief Justice Taft also sug-
gested that Nebraska be included in the Tenth Circuit because of its proximity to Kansas and
Wyoming and because the railroad from Chicago to Colorado passed through Wyoming and
Nebraska. Id at 67. Because there was no circuit judge residing in Nebraska, its inclusion
would not have affected the number of judges in either circuit.
19831
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Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Ar-
kansas remaining in the Eighth Circuit, and Colorado, Wyoming, Utah,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico forming the new Tenth Circuit. The
bill provided for five judges in the reconstituted Eighth Circuit and four in
the Tenth, an increase of three judges for the area covered by the old Eighth
Circuit.
7 1
Congressman Maurice Thatcher of Kentucky, submitted H.R. 13757,
proposing what was regarded as an east-west division of the circuit. Under
his proposal, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming would remain part of the Eighth. The Tenth Circuit would con-
sist of Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Utah. This division was patterned after a proposal made by Justice Willis
Van Devanter of Wyoming who felt it followed "recognized routes of travel
and commerce." 72 The Thatcher Bill also provided for nine judgeships, as-
signing six to the Eighth Circuit and three to the Tenth Circuit. 73
The Newton Bill was endorsed almost unanimously by the bar and
judges,74 and by two major railroads. 75 Several judges noted favorably that
the Newton Bill kept the mountain states intact and grouped the agricul-
tural states together, thus providing a basic division by type of litigation-
primarily mining and irrigation in the mountain states and agricultural in
the other states. 76 The Newton Bill also appeared to divide the case load of
71. The bill also provided that judges would remain where they were residing and would
preside in the circuit comprising that district. The Eighth Circuit would continue to hold court
at St. Louis and St. Paul. Denver was to be the seat of the new Tenth Circuit. See supra note 67.
72. Testimony of Justice Van Devanter, in Hearings, supra note 67, at 72.
73. The seats of the Eighth Circuit were to be St. Paul and Cheyenne; those set for the
Tenth Circuit were St. Louis, Denver, and Oklahoma City. Cheyenne had been listed as an
alternative seat of court to Denver for the Eighth Circuit under § 126 of the Judicial Code, but
was rarely used. See supra note 67.
74. It is unclear, however, whether the judges and lawyers received copies of the Thatcher
Bill. When the House Judiciary Committee was studying the two bills and wanted the views of
the district judges in the Eighth Circuit, Congressman Newton said he would ask A.C. Paul to
write to those judges whose opinions he did not have. At the Jan. 11, 1929 hearings, Newton
said that he had spoken with Mr. Paul: "I did not say anything to Mr. Paul about presenting
the Thatcher bill, because I did not understand that I was to do so." Testimony of W.H.
Newton, in Hearings, supra note 67, at 90. Because of illness, Mr. Paul was not at the committee
hearing and, thus, it is unclear what he did. In their responses, some of the judges mentioned
only the Newton Bill, stating that they received "the bill" or the "Newton bill," while others
specifically stated they favored the Newton Bill over the Thatcher Bill.
75. Both the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. and the Missouri-Kansas Texas Railroad Co.
wrote letters to the Committee favoring the Newton Bill. Bonn, supra note 56, at 25. The
interest of a Nebraska attorney who worked for the Union Pacific gave rise to speculation by
another attorney from that state:
It is my understanding that Mr. N.H. Loomis of the Union Pacific Law Department is
devoting an unusual amount of time and attention to the consideration of the Newton
Bill and its progress in Congress, and I am at a loss to know just what his deep and
particular interest in the Bill can be. We know, of course, that railroads are always
deeply interested in the appointment of Federal Judges and I am wondering whether
Mr. Loomis would be opposed either to you or me. It may be that he is only interested
in having the court sit at Omaha on account of the probable increase in passenger
traffic which might result.
Letter from J.C. Kinsler to Sen. G.W. Norris, Neb. (Feb. 23, 1929) (on file in the Library of
Congress, Norris papers) (cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 25).
76. Testimony of District Judges Kennedy and Farris, in Hearings, supra note 67, at 113-15;
Letter from Finley, Allen, & Dunham to I.G. Hersey (Jan. 2, 1929) (Hearings, supra note 67, at
[Vol. 66:2
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the old circuit fairly evenly.
77
By the close of the January 11, 1929 hearings, the Newton Bill had been
approved by all six circuit judges of the Eighth Circuit, the bar associations
of eight states of the circuit, fifty-two attorneys from the Eighth Circuit, and
by the ABA. 78 On January 28, 1929, after a few revisions, Congressman
Newton introduced the revised bill, H.R. 16658, to the House Judiciary
Committee. 79 On February 18, 1929, the House unanimously passed the
Newton Bill. After one amendment adding Kansas City, Missouri, as a seat
of the Eighth Circuit, the bill passed the Senate on February 23, 1929. The
House agreed to this amendment on February 25, and President Hoover
signed the bill into law on February 28, 1929.80
The Act required the Tenth Circuit to hold an annual term of court in
Denver and Wichita, and in Oklahoma City "provided that suitable rooms
and accommodations for holding court at Oklahoma City are furnished free
of expense to the United States."8 ' The legislative history of the Act, how-
ever, reveals no reason for this proviso. Five circuit judgeships were allo-
cated to the diminished Eighth Circuit and four to the new Tenth Circuit.
Section 4 of the Act, in effect, transferred Judges Robert E. Lewis of Colo-
rado and John H. Cotteral of Oklahoma from the Eighth Circuit to the
Tenth.8 2 President Hoover appointed United States District Judges Orie L.
Phillips of New Mexico and George T. McDermott of Kansas to fill out the
new court.
The Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction is unique in that one of the districts in
the circuit contains areas outside the state.8 3 The District of Wyoming in-
134); Letter from Utah Bar Ass'n to I.G. Hersey (Jan. 8, 1929) (Hearings, supra note 67, at 130)
(cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 49).
77. Judge Stone stated in a letter to A.C. Paul:
On the basis of cases filed in 1927 there are 222 cases in the first group [Eighth Circuit]
and 179 in the second [Tenth Circuit]; on the three year average there are 232 in the
first and 174 in the second group. To take care of this difference, the Newton Bill
provides for five judges in the first group and four judges in the second. By this in-
crease from the present six judges to nine in both of the two new circuits, the bad effect
of dividing the circuit is lessened.
Letter from K. Stone to A.C. Paul (June 30, 1928) (on file in Library of Congress) (quoted in
Bonn, supra note 56, at 23).
78. Bonn, supra note 56, at 27.
79. Notably, Wichita was added as a seat in the Tenth Circuit in response to suggestions
from W.A. Ayres, a representative from Kansas, and an ABA resolution calling for a seat of the
court in Wichita. Bonn, supra note 56, at 27. Omaha was also added as a seat for the Eighth
Circuit. Id. See also id at 27 for a list of other changes made in H.R. 13567 by H.R. 16658.
80. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 840, § 126, 45 Stat. 1346 (presently codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 41-48).
81. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 840, § 126, 45 Stat. 1347.
82. Section 4 reads:
Any circuit judge of the eighth circuit as constituted before the effective date of this
Act, who resides within the eighth circuit as constituted by this Act, is assigned as a
circuit judge to such part of the former eighth circuit as is constituted by this Act the
eighth circuit, and shall be a circuit judge thereof, and any circuit judge of the eighth
circuit as constituted before the effective date of this Act, who resides within the tenth
circuit as constituted by this Act, is assigned as a circuit judge of such part of the
former eighth circuit as is constituted by this Act the tenth circuit, and shall be a
circuit judge thereof.
Id at 1348.
83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 82-131 (1976). Some districts include entities that are, for many purposes,
treated as states. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 88 (1976) (District of Columbia); 28 U.S.C. § 119 (1976)
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cludes "those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana
and Idaho,' 8 4 and the statements of jurisdiction of Idaho and Montana ex-
pressly exclude the portions of the respective states within Yellowstone.
8 5
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1294 indicates an appeal from a reviewable deci-
sion of a district court is to be taken to the "court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the district."'8 6 United States Attorneys are appointed to serve in
a particular judicial district,8 7 and the duty to prosecute for offenses against
the United States applies "within his district." a Thus, the District of Wyo-
ming's jurisdiction over the entirety of Yellowstone seems clear. However,
courts have occasionally overlooked the boundaries of the district, drawing
the jurisdiction along state lines, even though the cases arise in Yellowstone
National Park.8 9
IV. THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CIRCUIT
The court convened for its first session on April 1, 1929, for the "pur-
pose of organizing said court. '"90 Senior Circuit Judge Robert E. Lewis pre-
sided. Circuit Judge John H. Cotteral and Marshal Richard C. Callen were
present. The first order of business was the appointment of Albert Trego of
Denver as Clerk of Court. Next the Court adopted its seal. Judges Orie L.
Phillips and George T. McDermott, then judges of the districts of New Mex-
ico and Kansas respectively, were assigned to the circuit and designated to
sit for its first session.91
On the second day of the session, the rules of practice were adopted,
providing for three regular terms to be held annually, one each at Denver,
Oklahoma City, and Wichita. Denver was designated as the location for the
clerk's office. It was ordered that practice, as far as feasible, was to be the
same as in the Supreme Court of the United States. Provisions were made
(Puerto Rico); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1405x-1405z (1976) (Virgin Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1424 (1976)
(Guam).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1976).
85. Id §§ 92, 106.
86. Id § 1294(1).
87. Id §541.
88. Id. § 547.
89. In the case of United States v. Sanford, 503 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S.
996 (1975), for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Montana district court's dismissal of an
indictment for game violations in a portion of Yellowstone Park falling within Montana. The
Ninth Circuit again dismissed on other grounds, United States v. Sanford, 536 F.2d 871 (9th
Cir.), and again was reversed by the Supreme Court, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (per curiam), all with-
out mention of the original failure of jurisdiction in the District of Montana. See Martin v.
United States, 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 432 U.S. 906 (1977); Rubenstein v.
United States, 488 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973).
This division of jurisdiction raises an interesting question regarding what law should be
applied in diversity cases arising in the Idaho and Montana portions of Yellowstone Park.
Under the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, federal courts
that exercise jurisdiction over a case solely by virtue of diversity of citizenship are to apply the
law of the state where the cause of action occurred. Id at 71-73. Apparently, then, a court must
apply Idaho or Montana law in diversity actions that arise within the boundaries of those states,
even though jurisdiction lies within the judicial district of Wyoming. The question has yet to
require judicial resolution.
90. 1 Tenth Circuit Record 1 (Apr. 1, 1929) [hereinafter cited as Record].
91. Id at 4-5.
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for the admission of attorneys and for the preparation of bills of exception on
appeals from the district courts.
92
On the third day of its first session, the court admitted Julius C. Gunter
to practice as an attorney.93 Gunter was a former justice of the Supreme
Court of Colorado and former governor of the state. On Mr. Gunter's mo-
tion, the court admitted to practice before it seventy-four lawyers from Colo-
rado and three from Wyoming.94 Rules were adopted governing review of
the decisions of the United States Board of Tax Appeals. Cases transferred
from the Eighth Circuit were ordered entered on the court's dockets for dis-
position in due course.
9 5
V. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE CIRCUIT
The Act of February 28, 1929, creating the Tenth Circuit, provided for
the transfer from the Eighth Circuit of all cases arising in the states assigned
to the Tenth Circuit in which no hearing had yet been held. By order of the
Eighth Circuit entered March 20, 1929, ninety such cases were transferred to
the new court. Of the first 238 cases transferred from the Eighth Circuit or
filed in the Tenth Circuit during the period April 1, 1929, to June 24, 1931,
the clerk classified eighty-nine as sounding in equity, 106 as law cases, and
forty-three as criminal. Thirty-two of the cases originated in the District of
Colorado, thirty-two in Kansas, twenty-two in New Mexico, thirty-seven in
the Eastern District of Oklahoma, thirty-four in the Northern District of
Oklahoma, fifty-four in the Western District of Oklahoma, seventeen in
Utah, and ten in Wyoming.
96
In addition to the official records, Mr. Trego, the first clerk, prepared a
set of hand-printed cards giving a brief summary of each of the first fifty-six
cases disposed of by the court. These cards and the docket summary sheets
show that the nature of the cases reaching the court in its first year differed
markedly from the type of litigation with which the court now deals. As
Howard K. Phillips, the present clerk, expresses it:
The sample [of the cases summarized on the cards] reflects the
period through which the nation was living at the time. For
example:
The crimes included violations of the Volstead Act. Bootleg-
gers and illegal distillers were being caught and prosecuted.
The cases reveal, in disputes over property of failing banks,
bankrupt estates, and attempts to defraud people who have money
or property, that hard times are just over the threshold.
We are still a young enough area to have numerous disputes
concerning the validity of patents issued to homesteaders. Several
of the earliest cases sought cancellation for lack of required resi-
dence, improvements or cultivation.
92. Id
93. Breitenstein, The United States Court of Appeals for the TenthJudiial Circuit, 52 DEN. L.J. 9,
10 (1975).
94. Id
95. Record, supra note 90, at 33.
96. Summary Sheet, Vol. 1, General Docket, U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Cir.
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The "energy" importance of the area is reflected by suits in-
volving coal lands, oil and gas lands, and mineral rights.
Taxes were a problem then, as now.
9 7
When the new court convened for its first session in Denver, its judges
could not have foreseen the changes in the American judicial system that
events would force on the courts. At that time, despite the warnings of a few
financial prophets, it was generally believed that the national economy
rested on a solid base. The Great Depression, ushered in by the stock market
crash of October 1929, vindicated the judgment of those few. The "Dust
Bowl Years," brought about by the drought of the 1930's, disrupted the
economy of all of the states within the circuit. Many farmers and stockmen,
as well as those whose livelihood depended on agricultural stability, lost their
farms and their businesses. Many banks and once-promising enterprises
failed.
In due course nature restored the land to its pre-drought condition, but
the effects of the Depression and especially of the governmental measures
adopted to alleviate depression-related distress remain with us to the present
time. In their attempts to deal with the nation's economic problems, the
executive and legislative branches created new agencies and granted them
unprecedented emergency powers. Changing conditions compelled the
courts to re-examine many time-honored legal concepts, with the result that
judges became more inclined toward sociological interpretation and applica-
tion of the law.98
The eight judges presiding over the district courts in the circuit were not
the disciplined and less colorful jurists we know today. The constitutional
guarantees of tenure during good behavior and undiminished salary fostered
judicial individualism. 99 The district court judges were akin to monarchs
ruling over their domains. Peter Graham Fish's comment on single-judge
district courts before the Court of Appeals Act of 1891 is relevant to the early
days of the Tenth Circuit as well:
They became lions on their relatively remote thrones. However
they might find or make the law, delay or accelerate the flow of
cases, reward or punish friends and foes with patronage and
favorable bench rulings, concerned none but themselves. Only ap-
pellate court reversals on points of law and impeachment for
crimes and misdemeanors limited their conduct.'o
It may safely be assumed-as older lawyers who practiced before some
of them still testify-that the judges of the federal trial courts of the first
quarter of this century were rugged individualists. They ran their own dock-
97. Letter from Howard K. Phillips to Judge Arthur J. Stanley (Sept. 5, 1979).
98. See R. POUND, I JURISPRUDENCE 158-78 (1959).
99. See Breitenstein, supra note 93.
John C. Pollock of Kansas had been a district judge since December 1, 1903; Tillman D.
Johnson of Utah since 1915; Colin Neblett of New Mexico since 1917; Robert L. Williams of the
Eastern District of Oklahoma since 1919; Thomas Blake Kennedy of Wyoming since 1921; J.
Foster Symes of Colorado since 1922; Franklin E. Kennamer of the Northern District of
Oklahoma since 1924; and Edgar S. Vaught of the Western District of Oklahoma only since
1928.
100. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 13.
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ets and were not disposed to yield to any person or any other court in the
exercise of their judicial powers.
VI. COURT ADMINISTRATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
A. The Judicial Conference of the United States
Growing popular dissatisfaction with cumbersome procedures and de-
fective judicial administration did not go unnoticed by many jurists and aca-
demicians, including Dean Roscoe Pound and William Howard Taft. Taft,
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was the prime
mover in legislation in 1922 creating the Judicial Conference of the United
States. ""
The bill proposing the original conference of senior judges was hotly
debated. Some senators feared that the Judicial Conference would be able
to give orders to every district judge in the Union. One senator protested
that the bill was "an assault upon the independence of the judiciary which
may grow and grow to sap and undermine that independence."' 0 2 Another
opponent predicted that the Conference would "become the propaganda or-
ganization for legislation for the benefit of the Federal judiciary."' 10 3 In the
House, the floor manager for the bill saw the Conference as not only provid-
ing a stage for the exchange of ideas but also leading to a greater uniformity
throughout the federal judicial system. The Chief Justice explained that the
Conference could not even criticize a judge, although he expressed the belief
that peer pressure would induce a fellow judge "to cooperate much more
readily in an organized effort to get rid of business and do justice."'0 4 With
the help of Attorney General Cummings, the original Conference was instru-
mental in bringing about the enactment of the Administrative Office Act of
1939.105
Until recent amendments,'0 6 the powers of the Conference to act di-
rectly on individual judges were ill-defined.' 1 7 Today the Judicial Confer-
ence may hold hearings, take testimony, issue subpoenas, give orders
necessary to the exercise of its authority, discipline a judge, and certify a
judge's disability.' 0 8 In addition, the Conference circulates information on
docket conditions and "submits suggestions and recommendations to the
various courts to promote uniformity of management procedures and expe-
l01. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, 42 Stat. 837-40 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 331, 456 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The Act authorized the Chief Justice to summon
the chiefjudge-then called the senior judge--of each circuit to a meeting to "make a compre-
hensive survey of the condition of the business in the courts of the United States and prepare
plans for transfer of the judges to districts in which they are needed, and to make suggestions to
the various courts as may seem in the interest of uniformity and expedition of business."
102. 62 CONG. REC. 4863, 5280 (1922).
103. 62 CONG. REC. 203 (1921) (remarks of Clarence Lea) (quoledin P. FiSH, supra note 39,
at 36).
104. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 39 (citing Informal Address by William Taft, Report of the
44th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 564 (1921)).
105. See Maris, supra note 5, at 823.
106. Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 4, 94 Stat. 2040 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981)).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981).
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ditious conduct of court business."' 0 9 The "suggestions" of the Conference
carry great weight, as a recent Associated Press article indicates:
The Judicial Conference is a powerful body that conducts all its
work behind closed doors and is little-known to the public at large.
Among its functions are the drafting and revising of the federal
rules of procedure and evidence, rules that determine how civil and
criminal trials are conducted in the federal courts."10
Few, if any, federal judges today ignore the "suggestions" of the Conference.
The Conference also continuously studies the operation and effect of the fed-
eral rules of practice and procedure' and recommends to the Supreme
Court rule changes that are intended to promote simplicity and fairness and
to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay." 2
Initially the Judicial Conference consisted of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the chief judges of the several circuits.' 1 3 A 1956
amendment added to the group the chief judge of the Court of Claims.' 14
Although Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips of the Tenth Circuit had advocated
district court judge participation as early as 1943, it was not until the 1957
session of the Conference that district judges were included. One judge is
elected to the Conference by the circuit and district judges of each circuit.
Later still, the Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was
added to the Conference's membership."' The 1982 creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit combined the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals and the appellate functions of the Court of Claims. 1 6 The
Chief Judge of the new Court of Appeals replaced the prior separate repre-
sentatives of those courts. The United States Claims Court, reorganized as
an Article I trial court, no longer is represented on the Judicial Conference
of the United States."i7 In 1984, two bankruptcy judges will be admitted to
the Conference." 8
Although Chief Justice Taft, the most active proponent of the legisla-
tion creating the Judicial Conference, favored including the Attorney Gen-
eral as a member, the Senate Judiciary Committee disagreed and eliminated
that portion of the bill.' 19 But the statute does provide that, upon the re-
quest of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General is to submit reports to the
conference "on matters relating to the business of the several courts."'
120
109. Id
110. Kansas City Times, Feb. 4, 1980.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 15, 62 Stat. 902 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
114. Act of July 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-659, § (d), 70 Stat. 497. See also P. FISH, supra note
39, at 254-57.
115. Act of Sept. 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-253, § 1, 75 Stat. 521 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1976)).
116. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 105, 111, 96 Stat. 25,
27-29.
117. d at 29.
118. They will be added Apr. 1, 1984. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 208, 92
Stat. 2549, 2660.
119. P. FiSH, supra note 39, at 32-33.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
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Conference committees, which may include nonmembers, play a vital
role in the ongoing work of the Conference. The committees meet on the
call of the chairman who is appointed, like the committee members, by the
Chief Justice. The chairmen attend the conference sessions and submit re-
ports of their respective committees for Conference consideration. The com-
mittees study not only matters referred to them by the Conference, but also
subjects brought to their attention by committee members or by other
judges. Then they submit recommendations to the Conference. In this man-
ner, as well as through their Conference representatives, judges contribute to
Conference deliberations. In 1968, the Conference established formal selec-
tion criteria, ordering that "general committees normally have a member
from each circuit and that standing committees and special committees
should have seven members, at least four of whom should be district
judges."' 2 1 Unless the Chief Justice decides otherwise, members serve non-
renewable terms of six years.
B. The Adminis/rative Offce of the United States Courts
During the Tenth Circuit's first ten years the administration of the fed-
eral courts was vested in the Department of Justice, as it had been since
1870.122 The courts depended on the Attorney General to prepare the judi-
cial budget, pay the salaries of court personnel, and provide needed supplies.
The Attorney General fixed the compensation of the clerks of the district
courts and the courts of appeal. Many federal judges, believing the Justice
Department was inattentive to the courts' needs, criticized this system.
12 3
Some members of Congress questioned whether the Justice Department's su-
pervisory power might influence judges in certain cases and thus inhibit the
impartial administration of justice. 124
The American Bar Association, led by its president, Arthur T. Vander-
bilt, proposed legislation to transfer the administrative functions of the judi-
ciary to an Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Chief Justice
Hughes and Attorney General Cummings approved the plan, although some
members of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Brandeis, opposed it on the
ground that it was the function of the courts to adjudicate, not to
administer. 125
After much discussion and many compromises, a bill was enacted creat-
ing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The administra-
tive and fiscal responsibilities that the Attorney General had exercised were
121. See P. FISH, supra note 39, at 278 (quoting Judicial Conference Report at 45 (1968)).
122. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 91.
123. Id at 102.
124. Sen. William E. Borah of Idaho stated: "In different ways and by different methods
other than by the usual practice judges are given to understand the views of the Government as
to what the law is and what the decision should be." 50 CONG. REC. 3166-67 (1913) (quotedin P.
FisH, supra note 39, at 103). Another Senator wondered how a federal jurist, under the constant
scrutiny of the Department of Justice, could be a fair and upright judge in litigation in which
the Department represented the Government. 72 CONG. REc. 10883 (1930) (remarks of Ken-
neth McKellar) (cted tn P. FISH, supra note 39, at 103).
125. See P. FISH, supra note 39, at 134-44.
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transferred to the Director of the Administrative Office. 126 The Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939127 has been heralded as "probably the greatest piece
of legislation affecting the judiciary since the Judiciary Act of 1789. ' ' 128 The
Act accomplished four important purposes: 1) it set up the Administrative
Office under the supervision of the Judicial Conference; 2) it made the
judiciary financially independent; 3) it created the Circuit Judicial Councils;
and 4) it required annual circuit conferences that include district and circuit
judges and members of the bar.' 29 The Administrative Office prepares the
budget for the judiciary, gathers statistics descriptive of the courts' opera-
tion, disburses funds, and performs other administrative functions.
To preserve the traditional autonomy of federal courts and judges, Con-
gress placed the Administrative Office under the supervision and direction of
the Judicial Conference. 130 The office's Director and Deputy Director are
appointed and subject to removal by the Supreme Court.131
The Judicial Conference wanted the Administrative Office to be "on
tap," but not "on top."' 132 The judiciary, not the Administrative Office, was
to constitute the fundamental source of administrative power and ultimate
responsibility for administrative decisions. The judiciary continued a watch-
ful attitude toward the Administrative Office and determined that the office
was to remain simply a tool for effective administration rather than a power
in itself.133 Orie L. Phillips, Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit from 1940 to
1956, noted the judges' continuing concern that the "Administrative Office
may get away from Us.'
3 4
VII. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COUNCILS
The most controversial provision of the 1939 Act created a judicial
council in each circuit.13 5 Originally each council consisted only of the cir-
cuit judges in active service and, unlike the judicial circuit conferences, the
councils included no district court judges or bar representatives. 36 District
judges lobbied for representation on the circuit council, but while the coun-
cils welcomed their presence at sessions affecting the operation of district
courts, district judges were not permitted to participate as members until
1981. Presently, if the council contains six or more circuit judges, at least
three district judges must be included in each circuit's judicial council; if the
council contains fewer than six circuit judges, at least two district judges
126. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (1976).
127. Pub. L. No. 76-299, ch. 15, 53 Stat. 1223.
128. See Parker, supra note 7, at 369; Maris, supra note 5, at 823.
129. See supra note 126.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1976).
131. Id § 601.
132. P. FisH, supra note 39, at 135.
133. Id at 145.
134. Id at 225 (Interview with Orie L. Phillips, Chief Judge, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 22,
1965)).
135. Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224.
136. Id. The idea of additional peer representation from these groups was considered and
rejected. See P. FIsH, supra note 39, at 159-61.
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must be appointed to the council.1 37 The Judicial Council of the Tenth
Circuit now consists of the chief judge of the circuit, four other circuit
judges, and two district judges. The Council is empowered to make "all
necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the busi-
ness of the courts within its circuit."'
138
Both Peter Graham Fish and Chief Justice Burger have criticized the
judicial councils. 139 Calling them "pillars of passivity," Fish has speculated
that the councils are inactive because of deference to trial judges and the
pervasive concept of an independent judiciary.' 40 In its early years, the
Tenth Circuit Judicial Council did little to affect the administration of jus-
tice in the circuit. 14' Since minutes of the council meetings were not kept
until February 1957, a meaningful assessment of the Council's accomplish-
ments during the early sessions is difficult. When new statutes were enacted,
such as the first Magistrates Act, the Jury Selection and Service Act, and the
Criminal Justice Act, councils had more duties assigned to them and conse-
quently began meeting more often. Also, in more recent times, the Judicial
Conference of the United States has sought and relied on the advice and
recommendations of the circuit councils in various matters.' 42 By recent
amendments effective October 1, 1981, the circuit judicial councils are now
empowered to hold hearings, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas
which are necessary to carrying out their duties.' 43 By setting the maximum
age of seventy years for the office of presiding chief judge, Congress allevi-
ated one of the most difficult administrative tasks--convincing senile judges
to retire from the office.
14 4
An order of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit led to what Jus-
tice Douglas called "the liveliest, most controversial contest, involving a fed-
eral judge in modern United States history."' 145 It brought the question of
137. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. IV 1980) (effective Oct. 1, 1981) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) The chief judge of each judicial circuit shall call, at least twice in each
year and at such places as he may designate, a meeting of the judicial council of the
circuit, consisting of-
(A) the chief judge of the circuit, who shall preside;
(B) that number of circuit judges fixed by majority vote of all such judges
in regular active service; and
(C) that number of district judges of the circuit fixed by majority vote of all
circuit judges in regular active service, except that-
(i) if the number of circuit judges fixed in accordance with subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph is less than six, the number of district judges
fixed in accordance with this subparagraph shall be no less than two; and
(ii) if the number of circuit judges fixed in accordance with subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph is six or more, the number of district judges fixed
in accordance with this subparagraph shall be no less than three.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
139. See P. FIsH, supra note 39, at 405; Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77 (1958).
140. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 405-09.
141. Letter from Emory G. Hatcher, Circuit Executive to Judge James K. Logan (Sept. 19,
1980).
142. Id
143. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
145. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 130 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). An-
other example of significant action by the Council in this area was certifying the disability of
Judge Ross Rizley of the Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1976)
on Mar. 26, 1965.
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the powers of the judicial councils into sharp focus, and may have provided
the impetus for amendments to section 332.146 In December 1965, acting
under 28 U.S.C. § 332, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit issued an
order directing that no cases were to be assigned to Judge Stephen Chandler,
United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma.
1 47
Judge Chandler sought a stay of the Council's order from the Supreme
Court. His request was denied on the ground that the order was "entirely
interlocutory pending prompt further proceedings."' 148 The Council sched-
uled a hearing, but cancelled it after learning that neither Judge Chandler
nor any other judge desired to attend. 149 Thereafter, the Council issued an
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332, authorizing the judge to sit only
on the cases assigned to him prior to December 28, 1965.150 Judge Chandler
acquiesced in the assignment of cases, but later challenged the order in a
petition to the Supreme Court, alleging that his acquiescence was a result of
both undue duress and a strategy to deprive the Judicial Council of jurisdic-
tion to assign cases under 28 U.S.C. § 137.151
The Supreme Court noted both the "imperative need for total and ab-
solute independence ofjudges in deciding cases or in any phase of the deci-
sional function,"' 5 2 and the legislative grant of power to the Judicial
Council which is necessary to enforce reasonable administrative stan-
dards. 15 3 Ultimately, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
Council's order was proper because it concluded the case was not in a pos-
ture for the extraordinary relief sought. 1' 4 Congress had provided a proce-
dure for evaluating ajudge's ability to discharge the duties of the office when
the judge is eligible to retire, but had specified no procedure for disciplining
a recalcitrant judge who was ineligible for retirement. 155 The Court indi-
cated that clarification of the statute was necessary:
Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the scope
146. The Senate Report on the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disa-
bility Act of 1980 states in part:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to establish a procedure for investigat-
ing and resolving allegations that a member of the Federal judiciary has been unable
to discharge efficiently all the duties of his or her office by reason of mental or physical
disability or has engaged in conduct which has been inconsistent with the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts.
An investigation of a complaint filed against a judge of the United States may
result in the dismissal of the complaint, a certification of disability, a request that the
judge voluntarily retire, an order that, on a temporary basis, no further cases be as-
signed to the judge, private or public censure or reprimand, the filing of a report to the
House of Representatives suggesting the possibility of impeachment, or other action as
deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4315.
147. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 78 (1970). The order indicated that if all
the active judges in the district could not agree on the assignment of cases, the Council would
make assignments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137. 398 U.S. at 78.
148. Id at 79.
149. Id at 80.
150. Id
151. Id at 86-87.
152. Id at 84-85.
153. Id
154. Id at 86-87.
155. Se 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1976).
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of the judicial councils' powers or the procedures to give effect to
the final sentence of § 332. Legislative clarification of enforcement
provisions of this statute and definition of review of council orders
are called for. 156
Despite this criticism, the statute has since been deemed constitutional.
157
Justices Douglas and Black dissented from the majority's opinion, de-
claring that the Council's action was, in effect, a removal of Judge Chandler.
Justice Black noted that every federal judge "is subject to removal from of-
fice only by the constitutionally prescribed mode of impeachment."'' 5 8 In
the view of Justice Douglas "there is no power under our Constitution for
one group of federal judges to censor or discipline any federal judge and no
power to declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a
judge."' 59 Since this decision, Congress has provided the councils with pro-
cedures for certifying the disability of a judge.160
Under the broad language of section 332, the councils have for many
years influenced the operation of the trial courts within their circuits in vari-
ous ways. 16 1 If the judges of a district court are unable to agree upon rules
and orders for dividing the workload among them, then by statute, the cir-
cuit councils must issue the needed orders.162 A district court may end pre-
maturely a regular session only if the council consents.' 63 No district may
put into operation its plan for the random selection ofjurors until it has been
approved by a panel consisting of the members of the circuit council and the
chief judge of the district.164 Similarly, a district court's plan for furnishing
representation for indigent criminal defendants 16 5 and its plan for the
speedy disposition of criminal cases166 require approval by the circuit coun-
cil or a panel that includes members of the council. Additionally, judicial
councils have rulemaking power 16 7 and, thus, may promulgate rules that
provide additional avenues for processing complaints of judicial miscon-
duct. 168 These rules do not provide an additional method of appealing the
merits of a decision, however, except in cases where no other remedies are
156. 398 U.S. at 85 n.6. The Court also noted that "nothing in the statute or its legislative
history indicates that Congress intended or anyone considered the Circuit Judicial Councils to
be courts of appeals en banc." Id at 83 n.5.
157. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 481 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 880 (1973).
158. 398 U.S. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 372(b), (c) (Supp. V 1981). In the Judicial Councils Reform and the Judi-
cial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Congress established a procedure for receiving anol
reviewing complaints of judicial misconduct. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 372 (Supp. V 1981). For a
thorough analysis of the Act, see Neisser, The New FeeralJudicial Dirciptine Act. Some Questions
Congress Didn't Answer, 65 JUDICATURE 143 (1981).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
162. Id. § 137.
163. Id § 140.
164. Id § 1863.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
166. Id. § 3165.
167. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 880 (1973).
168. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980).
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available to cure the effects of the misconduct. 169
The councils' powers to supervise the flow of cases in the trial courts and
to order the courts' nontenured supporting personnel to cease improper
practices have never been disputed. As Congress intended, the judicial coun-
cils remain the linchpin of judicial administration.
VIII. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT CONFERENCES
The Act established the judicial conferences of the circuits as another
mechanism for improving federal court efficiency. Unless excused by the
Chief Judge, all circuit and district judges must attend their respective cir-
cuit's annual conference. 170 Only the Circuit Justice and the circuit and
district judges attend the first day's session. In these executive sessions the
program ordinarily is restricted to the work of the courts within the circuit.
The trial and appellate judges, meeting as a single group, discuss ideas and
problems.
The Act also requires each circuit's court of appeals to provide for mem-
bers of the bar to be represented and participate at the Judicial Confer-
ence. 17 1 The circuits have responded in various ways. Some rotate lawyer-
delegate participation. 172 In others each circuit and district judge may in-
vite a certain number of members of the bar.' 73 The Tenth Circuit Rule
provides that any member of this circuit's bar in good standing may become
a member of the circuit conference by declaring in writing an intention to
become a member.174 By the terms of the circuit rule, if a lawyer-member is
absent from two successive annual sessions without leave of the Chief Judge,
he or she is dropped from membership. 175 Since all members of the circuit
bar in good standing are eligible for membership, as a practical matter, fail-
ure to attend meetings only results in the lawyer being dropped from the
circuit's mailing list.
In assessing the accomplishments of the circuit conferences, Chief Jus-
tice Burger has stated that "less than a majority of the Circuits have consist-
ently held meaningful conferences and in some places the conferences which
are held fall far short of what Congress intended."' 176 Peter Graham Fish
has remarked that most conferences have proved less than satisfactory. 177 He
believes that success of the circuit conference depends upon the chief
judge.178 The chief judges of the Tenth Circuit have improved federal-state
relations by controlling the programs of the circuit and by specially inviting
judges of the state courts and the presidents of the state bar associations
within the circuits. Tenth Circuit conferences have provided a meaningful
169. Id. at 769.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., 6th CIR. R. 16(c).
173. See, e.g., 5th CIR. R. 23.3.
174. 10th CIR. R. 19(b)(2).
175. Id.
176. Burger, supra note 139, at 78-79.
177. P. FIsH, supra note 39, at 341.
178. Id.
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and dynamic medium of communication between the bench and the bar.
The programs presented at the general sessions have traditionally been on
subjects of broad interest, timely, instructive, and well presented by knowl-
edgeable speakers. 179 In conjunction with the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the circuit conferences and councils have been instrumental
in setting up a promotional policy for judicial employees and prescribing
standards for probation officers and for referees in bankruptcy.180 The ses-
sions have provided platforms for advocates and opponents of proposed
changes designed to improve the administration of justice. In this way, the
use of pretrial conferences and discovery, which had been resisted by many
older judges and practitioners, has been "sold" to the bench and bar. At his
own and other judicial conferences, Judge Alfred P. Murrah, an enthusiastic
supporter of the "new" rules, so persistently and successfully advocated their
use that it was said in judicial circles that his middle initial stood for
"Pretrial."
IX. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The need to efficiently manage and administer cases docketed for ap-
peal' 8 ' and to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts in order to alleviate
congested dockets has long been recognized.' 82 This need has intensified in
recent years because the number of appeals filed in the federal courts of
appeals has skyrocketed. Between 1960 and 1973, the filings in all circuits
increased by 301%.t83 In 1981,184 26,362 new appeals were filed in the
United States Courts of Appeals, again the greatest number on record. 1'
8 5
This is a rise of nearly fourteen percent over 1980 and is fifty-eight percent
higher than filings in 1975.186 The increase resulted in 599 new appeals for
each three-judge panel of the courts of appeal. 18 7
Some commentators have termed the overload of the judicial system "a
crisis." 188 The factors contributing to this stunning increase include the
179. See, e.g., Proceedings, 1969 Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference, 49 F.R.D. 347 (1969)
(Chief Justice Burger's first official appearance as Chief Justice at a circuit judicial conference);
Proceedings, Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference, 44 F.R.D. 245 (1967).
180. See Mars, supra note 5, at 824.
181. See Burger, Shool for Judges, 33 F.R.D. 139, 140-41 (1964).
182. See Burger, Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119 (1973) (need for eliminating some fed-
eral jurisdiction and coordinating state and federal systems of justice).
183. The Geographical Boundaries ofthe SeveralJudzhial Circuits-Recommendations for Change, 62
F.R.D. 223, 227 (1974).
184. Statistics are gathered for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1981. 1981 Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
185. Id. at 186.
186. Id
187. Id at 13.
188. See, e.g., W. Heydeband, The Technocratic Administraton ofJustice, 2 RESEARCH IN LAW
AND SOCIOLOGY (1979). Heydeband asserted that:
The American judicial system is in a state of crisis. The main surface systems of this
judicial crisis are that the resources and the organizational capacity of the judiciary
are not keeping pace with the rising demand for its services. As a result, the nature of
adjudication and judicial administration as well as the tasks and the output of the
courts are being transformed. But while there is little disagreement over the surface
dimensions of the crisis, opinions differ as to its deeper causes, implications, and
remedies.
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rapid rise in crime in this country,18 9 statutory recognition of rights such as
those of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,190 the increasing tendency in this coun-
try to seek judicial resolution of disputes,19 1 and the judicial broadening of
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. The rate of increase of appel-
late cases is far beyond the rate of increase in federal district court filings. 
19 2
If the rate continues, by the year 2010 over one million cases will reach the
federal appellate courts each year, and 5,000 appellate judges will be needed
to cope with the load.
1 93
Legal commentators and judges agree that the answer to the overload of
cases is not increasing the numbers of judges. Justice Frankfurter noted that
a powerful judiciary is a small judiciary.194 In 1971, both the Committee of
Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States and
the Conference itself concluded that more than fifteen judges in a circuit
would prove "unworkable."' 9 5 Judge Henry J. Friendly has also argued for
a limited number of judges in the federal judiciary.
[T]here must come a point when an increase in the number of
judges makes judging, even at the trial level, less prestigious and
less attractive. Prestige is a very important factor in attracting
highly qualified men to the federal bench from much more lucra-
tive pursuits. Yet the largest district courts will be in the very met-
ropolitan areas where the discrepancy between uniform federal
salaries and the financial rewards of private practice is the greatest,
and the difficulty of maintaining an accustomed standard of living
on the federal salary the most acute. There is real danger that in
such areas, once the prestige factor was removed, lawyers with suc-
cessful practices, particularly young men, would not be willing to
make the sacrifice. 19 6
Many suggestions have been made to help reduce the case load of fed-
eral circuit and district courts, including wider use of arbitration,
decriminalization of some activities, more delegation of jurisdiction to ad-
ministrative agencies, the nonjudicial processing of certain matters such as
divorce and probate,19 7 an increase of the amount-in-controversy require-
ment for diversity actions, and such judicial actions as, where permitted,
awarding the prevailing party attorneys' fees or court costs to discourage
frivolous claims.198 Even if these ideas are adopted and successfully used to
limit federal court jurisdiction, it is clear that the judiciary can meet its
Id. at 29.
189. See Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 90-91
(1976).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
191. Burger, supra note 189, at 91.
192. Federal district court filings increased 58% in the same time period. See generally, Geo-
graphic Boundaries, supra note 2.
193. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
194. See Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976); Chief
Justice Warren, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 20, 1964)
(reprinted at 35 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1964)).
195. Geographical Boundaries, supra note 2, at 227-28.
196. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 29-30 (1973).
197. Refkind, Are We Asking Too Much Of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 105 (1974).
198. Sanders, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 112-19 (1974). See Roadway Ex-
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growing responsibilities only through the most efficient administration
possible.
In a speech at the American Bar Association's 1969 convention in Dal-
las, Chief Justice Burger said:
The Courts of this country need management which busy and
overworked judges, with vastly increased caseloads, cannot give.
We need a corps of trained administrators or managers, just as hos-
pitals found they needed them many years ago, to manage and
direct the machinery so that judges can concentrate on their pri-
mary professional duty of judging. 199
The need for improved administration has stemmed primarily from the un-
precedented increases in the number of appeals. In the 1960's and 1970's the
movement in the judiciary to improve the administration of justice and
court management resulted in the addition of administrative positions that
more than doubled the judiciary's total number of administrative personnel.
The following section will discuss briefly some of the mechanisms the Tenth
Circuit has adopted to meet the need for efficient administration, including
the clerk of court, circuit executive, staff attorneys, and the Appellate Infor-
mation Management System (AIMS).
A. Clerk of Court
The Clerk of Court has been the circuit's ministerial officer since the
circuit was formed. 200 The clerk's powers and duties are set forth in statutes,
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Rules of the Tenth Cir-
cuit. 20 1 The clerk is custodian of the court's records and papers, receives and
accounts for monies paid to the court, initiates a docket for each appeal, and
enters all filings in appeals. He or she issues calendars of cases for the terms
of court, enters orders of the court as the appeal progresses, files opinions,
and enters judgments disposing of appeals. Upon disposition of petitions for
rehearing, the clerk issues the court's mandate and, if certiorari is sought, the
clerk upon request prepares the certiorari record.
When the Tenth Circuit was formed in 1929, the first matter of business
undertaken by the court was to appoint the clerk, a Denver attorney named
Albert Trego. After the clerk had given bond in the sum of $15,000 with
surety approved by the court and had taken the oath of office, the court
adopted its seal and announced it was fully organized and in session.
20 2
Shortly afterward, Trego hired a deputy clerk. No personal files on Trego or
council minutes relating to the period of his tenure exist, though circuit files
reveal that Trego served continuously until his death late in 1939.
Robert B. Cartwright, who had been a law clerk to Judge Orie L. Phil-
press, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Note, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith and Award of
Attomys' Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 468 (1979).
199. Address by ChiefJustice W. Burger, American Bar Association meeting in Dallas, Tex.
(Aug. 12, 1969).
200. The court's authority to appoint a clerk and the clerk's authority to appoint necessary
deputies, with approval of the court, is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 711 (1976).
201. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 711,951-956 (1976); FED. R. App. P. 45; 10th CIR. R. 1, 3, & 13.
202. Record, supra note 90, at 2.
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lips since 1931, succeeded Trego on December 14, 1939. Cartwright was
reputed to have known every detail of every active case on the docket. 2
0 3
After serving as clerk for 27 years, Cartwright took early retirement in 1966
because of his health.
20 4
Mr. Cartwright was succeeded by his chief deputy, William L. Whitta-
ker, a Colorado lawyer. Whittaker had also served as a law clerk to Judge
Phillips. After serving as chief deputy from January 3, 1966, Whittaker was
appointed clerk when Cartwright stepped down at the end of that year.
Whittaker served until September 1970 when he resigned to go to Washing-
ton to serve as a deputy to Judge Murrah who became Director of the Fed-
eral Judicial Center after his retirement. 20 5
The current clerk is Howard K. Phillips, a Denver lawyer who suc-
ceeded Whittaker in September 1970. After serving in the Air Force during
World War II, Phillips practiced law in Denver until appointed a Denver
municipal judge from 1963 to 1964. He was manager of safety and excise for
Denver in 1968, and then was appointed clerk of court in 1970.
The office of the clerk has grown rapidly since 1970,206 when the staff
consisted of six deputies and only 743 appeals were filed. Even in 1975
filings were only up to 980, but by 1980 they were up to 1,402 and by 1981
they had risen another 12.5% to 1,577. Cases resolved during the year to-
taled 612 in 1970, 839 in 1975, 1,274 in 1980, and 1,244 in 1981, which left
pending cases at 580 in 1970, 716 in 1975, 1,298 in 1980, and 1,631 in
1981.207 By 1980 the office had sixteen deputies.
As the caseload increases, the operation of the clerk's office becomes
more complex. Acting in conjunction with the clerk's office, there are now
staff attorneys, an appeals expediter, a systems analyst, a LEXIS operator, a
computer system, and a word processing system. The AIMS computer pro-
gram has greatly aided retrieval of needed case information. Because of the
computer system, the clerk is able to report each month, with relative ease,
the total number of cases argued, cases pending, motions pending, and other
useful data. Similarly, the clerk prepares mailing lists of attorneys involved
in cases being argued on the next calendar and prints them on mailing
labels.
B. Oftce of the Circuit Executive208
The movement toward better court administration led, in 1969, to legis-
lation that proposed the appointment of court administrators. Support for
the proposal came from many sources, including Bernard G. Segal, then
president of the American Bar Association, and Chief Judge David T. Lewis
203. Letter to Judge James K. Logan from Howard K. Phillips (Sept. 8, 1980).
204. Letter to Judge Alfred P. Murrah from Robert B. Cartwright (Sept. 22, 1966).
205. Judge Alfred P. Murrah served as Director of the Federal Judicial Center from May
1970 to October 1974.
206. The year refers to the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1981.
207. See Management Statistics for United States Courts, 1975, 1980, and 1981.
208. This section draws significantly from a summary written by Emory G. Hatcher, Circuit
Executive for the Tenth Circuit.
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of the Tenth Circuit. 20 9
The Circuit Executive Act was signed into law on January 5, 1971. The
Act empowered circuit councils to appoint circuit executives and to vest in
them broad administrative control of all nonjudicial activities of their courts,
thus relieving circuit judges of many administrative chores. 210 The stan-
dards for certification of a circuit executive are set forth by statute,2 11 and
are applied by a board created for that purpose. 21 2 On August 1, 1972, the
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit appointed Emory G. Hatcher the first
circuit executive of the Tenth Circuit; he continues to serve in this position.
Subject to general supervision by the chief judge of the Tenth Circuit,
the circuit executive exercises administrative control over many of the
court's nonjudicial activities, including planning, organizing, and adminis-
tering a personnel system, acting as a liaison officer between the court of
appeals and the General Services Administration regarding furnishings and
space needs, advising the clerk of the court as to maintenance of the account-
ing system, conducting studies and making recommendations regarding the
business and administration of the court of appeals and the district courts
within the Tenth Circuit, and collecting and analyzing statistical data relat-
ing to court business. 21 3 Since the appointment of the circuit executive,
many notable administrative developments have been instituted in the
Tenth Circuit. Personnel policies and procedures have been streamlined.
The Tenth Circuit has adopted a comprehensive personnel manual-the
first in any United States court-that includes a grievance procedure and an
equal employment opportunity plan.
The Tenth Circuit was the first to apply to the Federal Judicial Center
for approval to test computer-assisted legal research. The concept was insti-
tuted in 1973. The Judicial Center leased a LEXIS terminal; when the sys-
tem proved very successful, the Tenth Circuit included it in its budget on a
209. Chief Judge Lewis expressed his approval of the Act:
Although I have served as ChiefJudge of the Tenth Circuit for only a few months
I am already keenly aware of the administrative burden that goes with the position.
Perhaps my recent experiences have not been typical for at present we have only four
working judges on this Court of Appeals, there being two unfilled vacancies and one
judge seriously ill. As a consequence it has been difficult to delegate any of the admin-
istrative duties and I have had to devote my time to administrative matters that could
well be handled by a court executive.
I have no doubt that a court executive would do much to improve the judicial
machinery and would allow the judges to better perform their intended function, the
decisional process. I hope H.R. 17901 will be enacted into law.
Letter from Chief Judge Lewis to the Honorable Emanuel E. Celler (Aug. 7, 1970) (Tenth
Circuit files).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1976).
211. Id §332(f) (1976).
212. Id
213. The office of the circuit executive also acts as the court's purchasing officer; serves as
secretary to the Judicial Council and the District Judges' Association; prepares all budgets;
approves Criminal Justice Act vouchers; maintains records of all court property; negotiates all
space needs with the Administrative Office and General Services Administration; serves on the
Library and Rules Committees; acts as staff in the area of fiscal management; serves as person-
nel officer; recommends policies and procedures to the court regarding case management; re-
ports to the Judicial Council matters requiring action; and performs numerous other
administrative duties.
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permanent basis. The Tenth Circuit now has terminals in Denver and
Oklahoma City.
The Tenth Circuit has printed a comprehensive loose-leaf Practitioners'
Guide to Tenth Circuit Procedures, which it sells to the circuit's practicing
bar. Again, this practice is the first of its kind and was made easier because
the Tenth Circuit has its own print shop, which is also unique to this circuit.
All of the court's slip opinions and internal forms are printed in-house. Ad-
ditionally, the print shop supplies many forms and all rules of court for the
eight district courts of the Tenth Circuit.
The circuit executive chairs an annual meeting of Tenth Circuit Clerks
of Court. As a result of these meetings, many areas of court management
have been improved and many procedures have been standardized. One
idea emanating from these meetings was the desirability of establishing a
uniform circuit-wide handling of petitions and complaints filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, and 2255, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.214 John K.
Kleinheksel, one of the staff attorneys, was assigned to the project. With the
assistance of the clerks of court and an ad hoc committee comprised of dis-
trict court Chief Judges Alfred A. Arraj, Frederick A. Daugherty, and Wes-
ley E. Brown, a plan was presented and adopted at the Executive Session of
Judges at the 1976 Judicial Conference of the Circuit. The plan effected a
circuit-wide uniform district court rule providing for standardized forms and
uniform processing of these complaints and petitions.
C. StaffAttorneys i'n the Tenth Circuit
The court's policy of encouraging district court judges to freely grant
certificates of probable cause and leave to appeal informa pauperis resulted in
prisoner cases overburdening the court's calendar. The court appointed an
attorney to brief and argue each case. The Criminal Justice Act did not
provide for the payment of compensation to counsel appointed for post-con-
viction matters; thus, the attorneys appeared pro bono pubhco. Many newly
admitted attorneys volunteered for these cases and, as compensation, the
court waived the ten dollar fee for admission to the Bar of the Tenth Circuit.
Prior to the fall of 1966, there was little preliminary review of ddcketed ap-
peals. Consequently, appointed attorneys were sometimes compelled to brief
and strenuously argue contentions that were totally untenable.
To remedy this situation the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit ap-
proved the concept of a central staff of attorneys in September 1966, and the
court obtained funding from the Administrative Office. Originally, the staff
attorney's primary responsibility was to review each prisoner case and rec-
ommend the appointment of counsel when necessary. In those cases in
which counsel was not appointed, the staff attorney wrote a memorandum
on the case which was made available to the panel to which the case was
assigned.
On November 14, 1966, John J. McDermott, was appointed the first
214. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV
1980).
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staff attorney. Under the guidance of Chief Judge Murrah, his work sub-
stantially reduced the number of attorneys appointed in post-conviction
cases.
As the project continued, its scope gradually expanded to make other
staff services available to the courts. Staff attorneys prepared proposed
drafts of per curiam opinions in those cases in which no attorney was ap-
pointed. They processed certain civil rights cases, provided procedural and
technical assistance to appointed attorneys, and responded to the large vol-
ume of written inquiries from prisoners and other laypersons.
Reviewing the process after some time of operation, the court developed
two concerns: the possibility that equal protection was not being afforded
because the process gave different treatment to a group of cases in which the
appellants typically were paupers, and the lack of advance notice to the par-
ties that such different treatment might occur. Since the screening technique
had proved successful in handling post-conviction cases, there was reason to
believe that it might be beneficially applied to all cases. As a result, the
court adopted Local Rule 10 (now Rule 9),215 the summary affirmance or
dismissal rule. The rule permits the appellee to file a motion to affirm on the
ground that the issues presented "are so unsubstantial as not to need further
argument," or to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. More im-
portant, the rule permits the court, on its own motion, to summarily affirm
cases when proper.
Under the authority of Rule 9, the staff attorneys review a case as soon
as an appellant's brief or a motion to dismiss or affirm is filed. Recommen-
dations relating to summary affirmance or dismissal are made to the court
and, if a summary action recommendation is approved, the parties are noti-
fied and given an opportunity to file a written argument supporting or op-
posing the summary action. If, after examination of these arguments, the
court agrees that summary action is appropriate, the case is returned to the
staff attorney to prepare for the court's approval a proposed draft of a per
curiam opinion. These drafts are circulated together with the record and
briefs to three-judge panels of the court, sometimes by mail and other times
to "Rule 9" panels sitting in Denver at regular court terms. The judges
approve, modify, or rewrite the opinions before their issuance, or they may
sometimes reassign the cases for oral argument on the regular appeals
docket.
McDermott established an index of cases by the issues raised, which
allowed him to provide to each panel of the court information about cases
involving similar issues before other panels. This index assisted the Tenth
Circuit in its efforts to avoid conflicting decisions. In cases to be argued, he
provided both the court and counsel with copies of relevant, unpublished
Tenth Circuit opinions. Thus, even before LEXIS, attorneys and the court
were able to evaluate the most recent law in the Tenth Circuit relevant to
the case being argued.
The utility of the McDermott subject matter index decreased as the
215. 10th CIR. R. 9.
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number of cases increased. To overcome this weakness a pilot automation
project was undertaken. This computer experiment was informative and an-
ticipated many systems now used, but financial support was unavailable and
the experiment was dropped. 21 6 AIMS currently fills the need of comparing
recent cases.
In 1967, a second staff attorney was authorized because of the increased
responsibilities of the Staff Attorney's Office; Arthur J. Katsiaficas was ap-
pointed. Subsequently, McDermott was promoted to Chief Deputy Clerk,
and one additional staff attorney was authorized. By 1972, staffing had in-
creased to four staff attorney positions. With the approval of Chief Judge
Lewis, it was decided to request increases in the size of the central staff until
there was one such position for each active circuit judge. The fifth staff at-
torney position was approved in March 1975, and presently the court has
eight staff attorneys.
The need for a person to supervise the central staff soon became appar-
ent and the position of senior staff attorney was authorized October 1, 1975,
for nine of the circuits, including the Tenth Circuit. Richard Banta, who
had been a staff attorney since August 1972, was appointed as the Tenth
Circuit's first senior staff attorney in November 1975. Permission was
granted in May 1978 to reclassify one existing position to that of first assis-
tant staff attorney. John Kleinheksel, who had been a staff attorney since
July 1973, was appointed to this position in June 1978. In September 1978,
senior staff Attorney Richard Banta resigned and John Kleinheksel was ap-
pointed to succeed him on the next day. Elizabeth D. Page, who had been a
staff attorney since August 1974, was appointed in October 1979 to succeed
Kleinheksel as first assistant staff attorney. Both are currently serving in
these positions.
D. Appellate Information Management System
The Tenth Circuit was the field test site and the first court to use the
automated Appellate Information Management System (AIMS). In Decem-
ber 1976, representatives from ten of the eleven federal appellate courts met
to begin defining their requirements for the system. Taking its original im-
petus from work of the Second Circuit, an AIMS committee was formed
under the guidance of the circuit executives with each court represented by a
designated functional analyst. The Federal Judicial Center provided funds
and technical guidance. The functional analysts and the Federal Judicial
Center created the AIMS Functional Description, basing it upon the agree-
ment between the courts on standard terminology, procedures, and require-
ments. After each circuit's review committee approved the functional
description, the Federal Judicial Center used it to develop the computer pro-
gramming required to support AIMS.
Beginning July 1, 1979, all pending cases were entered into the data
base. From that date forward all new case information, new motions, and
216. Whittaker & McDermott, Computer Technology n an Appellate Court, 54 J. AM. JUDICA-
TURE Soc. 73 (1970).
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scheduled actions have been entered. In November 1979, the Second Circuit
became the second court to use the automated system. Subsequently, the
Seventh and Fifth Circuits have begun the use of AIMS, and plans are to
introduce the system to the other federal appellate courts.
The clerk's office enters into the AIMS computer information relating
to each case. AIMS will then provide the clerk's office with reports detailing
all actions due or overdue. The statistical reports are made through AIMS
as a means of identifying trends in the types and volume of appeals being
processed. AIMS provides immediate display at the computer terminal of
the current status of each case. The system provides judges with reports de-
tailing their individual caseloads and with statistics on the workloads of their
court. It can also be used as a research tool for finding pending or completed
cases that deal with specific issues. Staff attorneys receive reports identifying
and grouping cases by issues.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit was created almost simultaneously with the stock
market crash of 1929. It has survived the great depression of the 1930's,
World War II and several smaller wars, the prosperity and burgeoning
growth of the late 1940's through the 1960's, and the cataclysmic changes in
criminal law, civil rights, and federal law in general. Yet its size, measured
in active judges, has only doubled from four to eight. The judges have some-
how managed the dramatically greater caseload. Increased staff and imagi-
native innovations in procedures, of which the Tenth Circuit has been a
pioneer, helped make this possible. Some prospective changes are predict-
able-increased population and caseload is based in part on the energy re-
sources concentrated in Tenth Circuit states. Other changes are not so
predictable, although certainly there will be a continued evolution in proce-
dures. Since humans are mortal, different judges, and perhaps different
laws, will control the future of the Tenth Circuit, but the changes are almost
certain to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, built firmly upon the
sound base of the past.
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